Date   

Re: Are we permitted to list items for sale on this group (specifically an SDS100 and SDS200)?

robertwichert
 

OK with me!


Robert Wichert PEng   LEED AP
Office: +1 916 966 9060
Mobile: +1 916 712 4481
On 11/13/2019 7:08 AM, Jennifer Bond wrote:

Are we permitted to list items for sale on this group (specifically an SDS100 and SDS200)?


Are we permitted to list items for sale on this group (specifically an SDS100 and SDS200)?

Jennifer Bond
 

Are we permitted to list items for sale on this group (specifically an SDS100 and SDS200)?


Re: P25 for Cheap

don robinson
 

All that, Joe, plus the LEO's have much more sophisticated equipment to investigate and plan raids with, such as the "stingray", which can monitor every cellphone in a given area. When they move in, they already know who-what-when-where, and if anybody runs, it's usually worse for them after the chase is finished.

On Tuesday, November 12, 2019, 02:40:48 PM PST, Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:


That's because raids are planned off the air. When was the last time you
heard the PD say "Hey - do you want to hit 123 Main street tomorrow?
Let's go in through the side door with 5 officers."

Of course you don't hear that. It's all planned in person and not on the
fly.

The most you will hear on the air for any raid is "Go! Go! Go!" at which
time the scanner does you no good at all.

Proper procedures and protocols (and TRAINING) will thwart scanner
advantages any day. This whole officer safety issue is a ruse and
isolates officers more than clear comms, thus decreasing officer safety.
The only thing encryption buys you is the ability to get away with
offensive comments which have no place on the air at all.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 4:57 PM, KA9QJG wrote:
> And  Everyone will notice
> on the News and the Paper that when they have a Big drug type raid they
> will point out The alleged bad people had a Scanner. WOW, What good did
> it do them but it was always pointed out.





Re: crypto comm

richardson_ed
 

Paul seemed to miss the point regarding the necessity for training and practising.  Deploying first responders with any tool or piece of equipment without proper knowledge and training is dangerous and could lead to someone getting injured or worse killed. Not just radios but any tool.

 

I don’t totally disagree with the “press to talk-release to listen” mentality.  The radio is a communication tool that should be second nature for the user. Yes radios are far more feature packed today compared to the 1974 era radio. However the basics remain unchanged. In my area the radios were deliberately made simple and most of the “advanced” user features were disabled. The user simply selects their channel/talkgroup, adjust the volume and “press to talk-release to listen”. The magic goes on behind the scene, transparent to the user.

 

  • Every time the user transmits, the GPS coordinates of the portable or mobile radio is sent to dispatch.
  • The users signals are received at 4 different receive sites and the beast quality signal is sent to dispatch and repeated via the repeaters.
  • The radio ID or an alias shows up on the dispatch screen so that source of a transmission can be identified, even if the user can not talk.
  • The trunked system prevents other users from transmitting over top of the first person talking.
  • The users can activate an “emergency” button if required. This will activate the microphone on the radio, send the gps location, and notify the dispatcher that the user requires priority assistance.
  • The dispatcher can override a long winded talker to voice a message that may be time sensitive.
  • The dispatcher can broadcast messages on multiple channels simultaneously.
  • Channels can be patched together to bring users from different areas or agencies all together on one channel.
  • Portable radio Battery time is vastly improved on the new digital platform.
  • Portable radios are smaller, lighter and more reliable than their previous devices.
  • All communications are encrypted,

 

Yes the new systems  are complex. But when designed with multiple redundancies, no single point of failures, the end result is a more reliable system than the old 1974 era platform. 

 

The end user still has pretty much the same experience. “press to talk-release to listen”

 

The training I referred to was knowing what channel/talkgroup  to use during an interagency event or how/when to activate their “emergency” button. Proper communication protocol, use of phonetics, etc. Also learning about the radio system they are using and any potential weakness or features can only help the end user.

 

Whether the radios are trunked, or conventional, analog or digital,  encrypted or clear, should all be immaterial to the end user. All they care is that it must be reliable. All communication systems marketed for public safety are designed to be more reliable, safer and feature rich than those even 10 years ago. The actual implementation of these systems is where the problem start.  Usually because of cost cutting.

 

On the other hand, acceptance of defective product or substandard radio network performance should not be tolerated. Engineers, manufacturers and state  or local officials that permit this to occur must be held accountable.

 

Change is not always good, not always welcome, but it is inevitable.

 

Paul, I am glad you were able to retire, hopefully safely and in good health. Thank you for your public service. BTW, my comments are based on spending 20+ years working with police, fire and ems field staff and listening to what they want and need. Thousands of years of real world experiences in our community. Our needs may be different than yours, but they are sound and valid.

 

Ed

 

From: main@Uniden.groups.io <main@Uniden.groups.io> On Behalf Of Paul Valeriani via Groups.Io
Sent: November 12, 2019 8:16 AM
To: main@uniden.groups.io; main@Uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

 

As a retired Police Officer, and former administrative communications officer for the department, I can tell you it's the Radio Manufacturers, sales people, and communications engineers that are going to get Police Officers, Firefighters, and other public safety personnel injured and killed.  It's not "hogwash",

"poor training" and "improper implementation" that are the culprits.

To blame training and procedures, practice, and drills as the culprit, is just wrong.  It's obvious that richardson_ed was never a Public Safety officer, working in the field, under high stress, dangerous conditions, and circumstances, but has come up with his observations from books, corporate guidelines, and his ivory tower.  
We need to get back to basics.  When I started on the job in 1974, the only thing you had to know about radios, was push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  We didn't have to be some sort of quasi engineers, on top of being Police Officers, and social workers, in order to do our job.  Drive the car, or walk the beat, enforce the laws, and push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  That's what we need to get back to.  Not trunked, encrypted, multi channel, computer controlled gadgets, that have too many moving parts, all subject to break down or fail, and leave the cop on the street, or the firefighter inside the burning building, alone, with their ass hanging out, with no communications, because this multi million dollar fiasco they have created, failed again.  But it's not the damn engineers fault, or the manufacturers fault who is pushing this agenda, making tons of money, on the backs of the street cops and firefighters who have to deal with their messed up radio systems during life and death situations.
Go into a Police station after a cop is killed and make the comments you made in your statement on this thread, and I can guarantee you won't walk out of that station in the same condition you walked in.
Push the button to talk.....release the button to listen!

 

On Tuesday, November 12, 2019, 02:40:55 AM EST, Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:

 

 

What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not. The system operator will not
program agency B's radios with agency A's channels. The operator's
argument is that there are common channels for interoperability, but
these channels do not carry the dispatch traffic for either agency.

How does agency B monitor agency A for interoperability? They used to be
able to use scanners, but scanners do not support decryption.

BTW, these are all LEO channels. In some cases, there are overlapping
coverage areas.

How do you solve this for interoperability? (and no, changing the system
operator's mind is not an option)

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 9:00 PM, richardson_ed wrote:
>
> As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous
> claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability.
> Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation
> are the culprits.
>
> Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained
> on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to
> interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and
> practise the procedures frequently.
>
> The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups.
> These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan
> calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the
> key for that radio better be in your radio.  The radio user should not
> care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the
> designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.



Re: P25 for Cheap

Joe M.
 

That's because raids are planned off the air. When was the last time you heard the PD say "Hey - do you want to hit 123 Main street tomorrow? Let's go in through the side door with 5 officers."

Of course you don't hear that. It's all planned in person and not on the fly.

The most you will hear on the air for any raid is "Go! Go! Go!" at which time the scanner does you no good at all.

Proper procedures and protocols (and TRAINING) will thwart scanner advantages any day. This whole officer safety issue is a ruse and isolates officers more than clear comms, thus decreasing officer safety. The only thing encryption buys you is the ability to get away with offensive comments which have no place on the air at all.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 4:57 PM, KA9QJG wrote:
And Everyone will notice
on the News and the Paper that when they have a Big drug type raid they
will point out The alleged bad people had a Scanner. WOW, What good did
it do them but it was always pointed out.


Re: P25 for Cheap

KA9QJG
 

Jim, In My example it was a PD officer who had called for help using an analog Motorola radio on a Motorola UHF Analog system  The dispatcher did not hear him but a Scanner listener a block away from the officer did,  He was listening to the input and output of the repeater on  UHF 460 Range. He called 911 and informed the dispatcher who did not hear the officer and was able to relay the info and probably saved the officer from harm and others too.  I just put this out because of some of the comments about what is being perceived by people listening to scanner AKA  Bad ol Scanner listeners  LOL .. And  Everyone will notice on the News and the Paper that when they have a Big drug type raid they will point out The alleged bad people had a Scanner. WOW, What good did it do them but it was always pointed out.

 

About your testing  I have a Motorola Quantar P25/Mixed mode on 444.750, one day a user was outside in a city a few miles away and was using a Mot XTS-3000 Analog He was real noisy and not understandable, I ask him to stay in the same position and switch over to P25 Digital.  Wow as much as I hate to admit He was loud and clear. I am just an old Analog guy LOL   I will  put a HT On My Motorola Service Monitor and check a weak battery on Analog and Digital and see if it’s the same ..

 

In My area, Lake Co Indiana they were forced mandated to go over to a New Motorola System 2 P25 System And a few are Encrypted as needed in some incidents.   As  you and others know the cost of the Motorola APX  Radios are very expensive Millions  of Dollars  for the new system, they finally got most of the bugs out, I do not wish to upset any of our techs on this site ,  But  You can have a Multimillion-Dollar systems that some were bided on and some won because  of politics .. But if The big sellers Like Motorola and others do not send their techs to school to learn how to set up the system they will have problems.  I have a few friends who are Certified Motorola Two way techs and they agree.

 

I know a  25 yr FD Vet Chief  He told Me he will let his dept use the fancy new Motorola APX Radios responding and taking calls but He will only let His Firefighters at the fire use their old Motorola HT-1000 Radios. He will not let a computer decide where to send the call for help in a burning building. But once again that could be because the Radios were not set up correctly for direct/simplex ops.. 

 

Happy  and Responsible Scanning  while We can

 

Don KA9QJG

 

60 yrs in Communications US Navy, Law Enforcement, E-911 Communications, CB .Ham 4 repeaters on the Air , Owner yrs ago of Scanner Shop Communications Research  and My expensive SDS-100 so I can still listen to some of our local communications  This  is as we all know a Very Wonderful Hobby  Lots of great info on this Long thread Maybe a littler to much Tech info it  only confused  anyone wanting to do anything illegal it’s all about the Money

 

Ps    In Indiana we have an Anti Scanner law one of 3 States unless we are exempt.  As  Scanner users, we all know there is more to this wonderful hobby then just listening to PD/FD Etc   They enforce the  Scanner law ,  one time I got pulled over for My suspicious-looking Ant  19 in 2 meters,  which was called a PD Ant LOL.    Officer said Are you listening to us on that illegal scanner. I said No officer  it is too boring  I had an Xtal Controlled   regency with the flashing red lights all on the Aircraft   band  108-138   ,He turned it up tested his radio never heard anything but did hear Airplanes, He looked at me and said well maybe you are a terrorist  and He should let Homeland Security know LOL   I said let them Know I listen to Trains and Boats too .. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io] On Behalf Of Jim Walls
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2019 11:10 AM
To: 'main@Uniden.groups.io'
Subject: Re: [Uniden] P25 for Cheap

 

It is correct that with digital, the threshold between good and bad reception is very small.  What is a VERY common misconception is that analog will just be starting to get noisy when the digital goes away.  In reality, the analog will be unreadable long before the digital goes bad.  We have demonstrated that more times then I care to remember at work.  We had a beautiful opportunity to demonstrate that when we first moved our fire dispatch to our trunked system.  We had analog conventional repeaters, analog trunked talkgroups, and digital trunked talkgroups that were all using identical Motorola Quantar repeaters and the same antennas (with transmit combiners and receive multicouplers).  We routinely demonstrated to firefighters that the analog was either very noisy, unreadable, or totally gone when the digital still worked quite well.  Never once did we find the reverse to be true.  Note that this is with real radios – NOT scanners.  Real radios DO handle some situations better than scanners (simulcast is a good example).

 

 

Jim Walls - K6CCC  City of Glendale

Information Services  Wireless Communications

120 N. Isabel St.  Glendale, CA 91206 (818) 548-4804

jwalls@...

 

From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io] On Behalf Of Mark Lassman via Groups.Io
Sent: Sunday, November 10, 2019 10:28
To: main@uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] P25 for Cheap

 

CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Exactly. With analog, you could hear a weak signal if you were close enough, but with digital, you’re absolutely correct: it’s all or nothing. If you’re not 100% “in” you’re not “in” at all. 

 

Please explain to me how digital makes things better and safer for our police and firefighters? 

 

On Nov 9, 2019, at 5:02 PM, KA9QJG <KA9QJG@...> wrote:

With the New Digital you either  hear it or you don’t  when the battery gets weak…

 


Re: crypto comm

Shawn Benoit
 

These poor guy are scrutinized for everything by a bunch of arm chair lawyers. They are damned no matter what they do.


On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 11:20 AM Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:
If people show up and interfere, arrest them. That's why those laws
exist. Poor judgement by a few does not justify full encryption.

Most of those against spectators don't want their actions
on camera. It's the same mentality that demands encryption.
Personally I could care less. If I'm doing my job correctly,
there is no reason to protest being on camera.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 9:38 AM, William Barrett, KW1B wrote:
> In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in
> emergency
> communication circles at all levels.
> One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
> very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
> many additional Critical Fault Points come into being.  It usually takes
> expert
> technical people to restore normal operation.  Long delays when one of these
> systems blows a gut happen.  Complete loss of integrated call-center
> dispatch
> points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
> happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
> These things can be delicate.  Great and efficient when they're working,
> and all
> is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
> Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
> and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
> have all happened more often than any of us would like.
> I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town.  The F.D. was on
> low-band
> simplex.  100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the
> firehouse,
> and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few
> dead-spots,
> but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just
> outside of the
> crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe
> three times
> in over thirty years.  It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew
> enough from
> their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
> Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
> magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
> hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
> very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
> priority service.  In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for
> the techs.
> One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
> Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
> any emergency passed.  (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
> Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital,
> trunked
> and encrypted system  for all Public Safety Agencies.  Well, the road guys,
> and the building inspector guys and even  the dog guy all wanted a piece of
> the new system, too -- because it would be */_so_/* much better than
> their old-fashioned
> mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters.
> A couple of *_years_* later, they finished ironing out all the many
> cramps and problems
> and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly  necessary towers, the
> enviros didn't
> like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give
> them cancer,
> and they ALL had lawyers).
> Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and
> then it had a
> couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the
> catterwaulling
> and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
> */My point:/*  to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the
> systems are
> delicate, and failures are more universal (the */entire/* thing fails)
> and hard to quickly
> work around and fix.
> Cops wanna be totally encrypted? Fine.  Lots of good arguments for it.
> Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
> data-deny the general public? Fine.  Macht nichts to me.  Keep the idiots
> away.  No problem.
> But accept this:  the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to
> fix,
> and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully."  They never
> work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all.  Suddenly at times.
> I speak for no one other than myself.
>    73
> KW1B
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]*On Behalf
> Of *richardson_ed
> *Sent:* Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
> *To:* main@Uniden.groups.io
> *Subject:* Re: [Uniden] crypto comm
>
>     Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary
>     depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.
>
>     As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the
>     erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to
>     interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and
>     improper implementation are the culprits.
>
>     Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly
>     trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when
>     it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they
>     should drill and practise the procedures frequently.
>
>     The system planners will designate either common channels or
>     talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the
>     interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of
>     another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your
>     radio.  The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or
>     clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and
>     communicate as trained.
>
>     (snip for bandwidth)
>
>
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>
>       Virus-free. www.avg.com
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>
>
>
> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
>




Re: P25 for Cheap

Jim Walls
 

It is correct that with digital, the threshold between good and bad reception is very small.  What is a VERY common misconception is that analog will just be starting to get noisy when the digital goes away.  In reality, the analog will be unreadable long before the digital goes bad.  We have demonstrated that more times then I care to remember at work.  We had a beautiful opportunity to demonstrate that when we first moved our fire dispatch to our trunked system.  We had analog conventional repeaters, analog trunked talkgroups, and digital trunked talkgroups that were all using identical Motorola Quantar repeaters and the same antennas (with transmit combiners and receive multicouplers).  We routinely demonstrated to firefighters that the analog was either very noisy, unreadable, or totally gone when the digital still worked quite well.  Never once did we find the reverse to be true.  Note that this is with real radios – NOT scanners.  Real radios DO handle some situations better than scanners (simulcast is a good example).

 

 

Jim Walls - K6CCC  City of Glendale

Information Services  Wireless Communications

120 N. Isabel St.  Glendale, CA 91206 (818) 548-4804

jwalls@...

 

From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io] On Behalf Of Mark Lassman via Groups.Io
Sent: Sunday, November 10, 2019 10:28
To: main@uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] P25 for Cheap

 

CAUTION: This email was delivered from the Internet. Do not click links, open attachments, or reply if you are unsure as to the sender.

Exactly. With analog, you could hear a weak signal if you were close enough, but with digital, you’re absolutely correct: it’s all or nothing. If you’re not 100% “in” you’re not “in” at all. 

 

Please explain to me how digital makes things better and safer for our police and firefighters? 

 

On Nov 9, 2019, at 5:02 PM, KA9QJG <KA9QJG@...> wrote:

With the New Digital you either  hear it or you don’t  when the battery gets weak…

 


Re: crypto comm

Steve Black
 

Every storm the reporters go to the local beach to show the oceans fury. Some idiots go to the beach and soak their cars in brine to see the breaking waves. Should we encrypt the news also to protect the cars from their owners. Steve kb1chu



Sent from the smartphone I said I'd  never get.

-------- Original message --------
From: "Joe M." <mch@...>
Date: 11/12/19 11:19 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: main@Uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

If people show up and interfere, arrest them. That's why those laws
exist. Poor judgement by a few does not justify full encryption.

Most of those against spectators don't want their actions
on camera. It's the same mentality that demands encryption.
Personally I could care less. If I'm doing my job correctly,
there is no reason to protest being on camera.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 9:38 AM, William Barrett, KW1B wrote:
> In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in
> emergency
> communication circles at all levels.
> One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
> very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
> many additional Critical Fault Points come into being.  It usually takes
> expert
> technical people to restore normal operation.  Long delays when one of these
> systems blows a gut happen.  Complete loss of integrated call-center
> dispatch
> points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
> happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
> These things can be delicate.  Great and efficient when they're working,
> and all
> is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
> Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
> and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
> have all happened more often than any of us would like.
> I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town.  The F.D. was on
> low-band
> simplex.  100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the
> firehouse,
> and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few
> dead-spots,
> but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just
> outside of the
> crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe
> three times
> in over thirty years.  It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew
> enough from
> their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
> Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
> magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
> hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
> very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
> priority service.  In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for
> the techs.
> One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
> Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
> any emergency passed.  (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
> Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital,
> trunked
> and encrypted system  for all Public Safety Agencies.  Well, the road guys,
> and the building inspector guys and even  the dog guy all wanted a piece of
> the new system, too -- because it would be */_so_/* much better than
> their old-fashioned
> mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters.
> A couple of *_years_* later, they finished ironing out all the many
> cramps and problems
> and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly  necessary towers, the
> enviros didn't
> like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give
> them cancer,
> and they ALL had lawyers).
> Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and
> then it had a
> couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the
> catterwaulling
> and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
> */My point:/*  to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the
> systems are
> delicate, and failures are more universal (the */entire/* thing fails)
> and hard to quickly
> work around and fix.
> Cops wanna be totally encrypted? Fine.  Lots of good arguments for it.
> Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
> data-deny the general public? Fine.  Macht nichts to me.  Keep the idiots
> away.  No problem.
> But accept this:  the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to
> fix,
> and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully."  They never
> work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all.  Suddenly at times.
> I speak for no one other than myself.
>    73
> KW1B
> -----Original Message-----
> *From:* main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]*On Behalf
> Of *richardson_ed
> *Sent:* Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
> *To:* main@Uniden.groups.io
> *Subject:* Re: [Uniden] crypto comm
>
>     Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary
>     depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.
>
>     As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the
>     erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to
>     interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and
>     improper implementation are the culprits.
>
>     Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly
>     trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when
>     it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they
>     should drill and practise the procedures frequently.
>
>     The system planners will designate either common channels or
>     talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the
>     interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of
>     another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your
>     radio.  The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or
>     clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and
>     communicate as trained.
>
>     (snip for bandwidth)
>
>
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>
> Virus-free. www.avg.com
> <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>
>
>
> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>
>




Re: crypto comm

Joe M.
 

If people show up and interfere, arrest them. That's why those laws exist. Poor judgement by a few does not justify full encryption.

Most of those against spectators don't want their actions
on camera. It's the same mentality that demands encryption.
Personally I could care less. If I'm doing my job correctly,
there is no reason to protest being on camera.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 9:38 AM, William Barrett, KW1B wrote:
In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in
emergency
communication circles at all levels.
One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
many additional Critical Fault Points come into being. It usually takes
expert
technical people to restore normal operation. Long delays when one of these
systems blows a gut happen. Complete loss of integrated call-center
dispatch
points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
These things can be delicate. Great and efficient when they're working,
and all
is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
have all happened more often than any of us would like.
I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town. The F.D. was on
low-band
simplex. 100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the
firehouse,
and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few
dead-spots,
but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just
outside of the
crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe
three times
in over thirty years. It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew
enough from
their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
priority service. In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for
the techs.
One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
any emergency passed. (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital,
trunked
and encrypted system for all Public Safety Agencies. Well, the road guys,
and the building inspector guys and even the dog guy all wanted a piece of
the new system, too -- because it would be */_so_/* much better than
their old-fashioned
mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters.
A couple of *_years_* later, they finished ironing out all the many
cramps and problems
and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly necessary towers, the
enviros didn't
like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give
them cancer,
and they ALL had lawyers).
Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and
then it had a
couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the
catterwaulling
and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
*/My point:/* to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the
systems are
delicate, and failures are more universal (the */entire/* thing fails)
and hard to quickly
work around and fix.
Cops wanna be totally encrypted? Fine. Lots of good arguments for it.
Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
data-deny the general public? Fine. Macht nichts to me. Keep the idiots
away. No problem.
But accept this: the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to
fix,
and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully." They never
work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all. Suddenly at times.
I speak for no one other than myself.
73
KW1B
-----Original Message-----
*From:* main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]*On Behalf
Of *richardson_ed
*Sent:* Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
*To:* main@Uniden.groups.io
*Subject:* Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary
depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.

As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the
erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to
interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and
improper implementation are the culprits.

Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly
trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when
it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they
should drill and practise the procedures frequently.

The system planners will designate either common channels or
talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the
interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of
another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your
radio. The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or
clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and
communicate as trained.

(snip for bandwidth)


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Virus-free. www.avg.com
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<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>


Re: crypto comm

Joe M.
 

You spend a whole post agreeing with me then make some
comment about how I made comments that are offensive?

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 9:15 AM, Paul Valeriani via Groups.Io wrote:
As a retired Police Officer, and former administrative communications
officer for the department, I can tell you it's the Radio Manufacturers,
sales people, and communications engineers that are going to get Police
Officers, Firefighters, and other public safety personnel injured and
killed. It's not "hogwash",
"poor training" and "improper implementation" that are the culprits.
To blame training and procedures, practice, and drills as the culprit,
is just wrong. It's obvious that richardson_ed was never a Public
Safety officer, working in the field, under high stress, dangerous
conditions, and circumstances, but has come up with his observations
from books, corporate guidelines, and his ivory tower.
We need to get back to basics. When I started on the job in 1974, the
only thing you had to know about radios, was push the button to talk,
release the button to listen. We didn't have to be some sort of quasi
engineers, on top of being Police Officers, and social workers, in order
to do our job. Drive the car, or walk the beat, enforce the laws, and
push the button to talk, release the button to listen. That's what we
need to get back to. Not trunked, encrypted, multi channel, computer
controlled gadgets, that have too many moving parts, all subject to
break down or fail, and leave the cop on the street, or the firefighter
inside the burning building, alone, with their ass hanging out, with no
communications, because this multi million dollar fiasco they have
created, failed again. But it's not the damn engineers fault, or the
manufacturers fault who is pushing this agenda, making tons of money, on
the backs of the street cops and firefighters who have to deal with
their messed up radio systems during life and death situations.
Go into a Police station after a cop is killed and make the comments you
made in your statement on this thread, and I can guarantee you won't
walk out of that station in the same condition you walked in.
Push the button to talk.....release the button to listen!

On Tuesday, November 12, 2019, 02:40:55 AM EST, Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:


What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not. The system operator will not
program agency B's radios with agency A's channels. The operator's
argument is that there are common channels for interoperability, but
these channels do not carry the dispatch traffic for either agency.

How does agency B monitor agency A for interoperability? They used to be
able to use scanners, but scanners do not support decryption.

BTW, these are all LEO channels. In some cases, there are overlapping
coverage areas.

How do you solve this for interoperability? (and no, changing the system
operator's mind is not an option)

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 9:00 PM, richardson_ed wrote:
>
> As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous
> claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability.
> Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation
> are the culprits.
>
> Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained
> on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to
> interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and
> practise the procedures frequently.
>
> The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups.
> These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan
> calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the
> key for that radio better be in your radio. The radio user should not
> care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the
> designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.




<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>
Virus-free. www.avg.com
<http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=emailclient>


<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>


Re: crypto comm

Bernie Burawski
 

Look at the state of the country right now; I don’t see a solution. Like everything involving change, just adapt to it and move on already. 


Bernie 
KJ4BWQ 

On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 11:00 AM William Barrett, KW1B <wbarrett@...> wrote:
In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in emergency
communication circles at all levels.
 
One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
many additional Critical Fault Points come into being.  It usually takes expert
technical people to restore normal operation.  Long delays when one of these
systems blows a gut happen.  Complete loss of integrated call-center dispatch
points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
 
These things can be delicate.  Great and efficient when they're working, and all
is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
 
Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
have all happened more often than any of us would like.
 
I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town.  The F.D. was on low-band
simplex.  100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the firehouse,
and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few dead-spots,
but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just outside of the
crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe three times
in over thirty years.  It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew enough from
their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
 
Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
priority service.  In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for the techs.
 
One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
any emergency passed.  (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
 
Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital, trunked
and encrypted system  for all Public Safety Agencies.  Well, the road guys,
and the building inspector guys and even  the dog guy all wanted a piece of
the new system, too -- because it would be so much better than their old-fashioned
mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters. 
 
A couple of years later, they finished ironing out all the many cramps and problems
and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly  necessary towers, the enviros didn't
like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give them cancer,
and they ALL had lawyers).
 
Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and then it had a
couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the catterwaulling
and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
 
My point:  to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the systems are
delicate, and failures are more universal (the entire thing fails) and hard to quickly
work around and fix. 
 
Cops wanna be totally encrypted?  Fine.  Lots of good arguments for it.
 
Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
data-deny the general public?  Fine.  Macht nichts to me.  Keep the idiots
away.  No problem.
 
But accept this:  the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to fix,
and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully."  They never
work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all.  Suddenly at times.
 
I speak for no one other than myself.
 
  73
KW1B
 
 
 -----Original Message-----
From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]On Behalf Of richardson_ed
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
To: main@Uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.

 

As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation are the culprits.

 

Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and practise the procedures frequently.

 

The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your radio.  The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.

 

(snip for bandwidth)

--
Bernie Burawski


Re: crypto comm

William Barrett, KW1B
 


In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in emergency
communication circles at all levels.
 
One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
many additional Critical Fault Points come into being.  It usually takes expert
technical people to restore normal operation.  Long delays when one of these
systems blows a gut happen.  Complete loss of integrated call-center dispatch
points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
 
These things can be delicate.  Great and efficient when they're working, and all
is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
 
Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
have all happened more often than any of us would like.
 
I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town.  The F.D. was on low-band
simplex.  100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the firehouse,
and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few dead-spots,
but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just outside of the
crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe three times
in over thirty years.  It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew enough from
their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
 
Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
priority service.  In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for the techs.
 
One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
any emergency passed.  (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
 
Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital, trunked
and encrypted system  for all Public Safety Agencies.  Well, the road guys,
and the building inspector guys and even  the dog guy all wanted a piece of
the new system, too -- because it would be so much better than their old-fashioned
mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters. 
 
A couple of years later, they finished ironing out all the many cramps and problems
and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly  necessary towers, the enviros didn't
like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give them cancer,
and they ALL had lawyers).
 
Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and then it had a
couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the catterwaulling
and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
 
My point:  to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the systems are
delicate, and failures are more universal (the entire thing fails) and hard to quickly
work around and fix. 
 
Cops wanna be totally encrypted?  Fine.  Lots of good arguments for it.
 
Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
data-deny the general public?  Fine.  Macht nichts to me.  Keep the idiots
away.  No problem.
 
But accept this:  the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to fix,
and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully."  They never
work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all.  Suddenly at times.
 
I speak for no one other than myself.
 
  73
KW1B
 
 

 -----Original Message-----
From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]On Behalf Of richardson_ed
Sent: Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
To: main@Uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.

 

As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation are the culprits.

 

Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and practise the procedures frequently.

 

The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your radio.  The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.

 

(snip for bandwidth)


Re: crypto comm

Paul Valeriani <rebelsun2000@...>
 

As a retired Police Officer, and former administrative communications officer for the department, I can tell you it's the Radio Manufacturers, sales people, and communications engineers that are going to get Police Officers, Firefighters, and other public safety personnel injured and killed.  It's not "hogwash",
"poor training" and "improper implementation" that are the culprits.
To blame training and procedures, practice, and drills as the culprit, is just wrong.  It's obvious that richardson_ed was never a Public Safety officer, working in the field, under high stress, dangerous conditions, and circumstances, but has come up with his observations from books, corporate guidelines, and his ivory tower.  
We need to get back to basics.  When I started on the job in 1974, the only thing you had to know about radios, was push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  We didn't have to be some sort of quasi engineers, on top of being Police Officers, and social workers, in order to do our job.  Drive the car, or walk the beat, enforce the laws, and push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  That's what we need to get back to.  Not trunked, encrypted, multi channel, computer controlled gadgets, that have too many moving parts, all subject to break down or fail, and leave the cop on the street, or the firefighter inside the burning building, alone, with their ass hanging out, with no communications, because this multi million dollar fiasco they have created, failed again.  But it's not the damn engineers fault, or the manufacturers fault who is pushing this agenda, making tons of money, on the backs of the street cops and firefighters who have to deal with their messed up radio systems during life and death situations.
Go into a Police station after a cop is killed and make the comments you made in your statement on this thread, and I can guarantee you won't walk out of that station in the same condition you walked in.
Push the button to talk.....release the button to listen!

On Tuesday, November 12, 2019, 02:40:55 AM EST, Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:


What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not. The system operator will not
program agency B's radios with agency A's channels. The operator's
argument is that there are common channels for interoperability, but
these channels do not carry the dispatch traffic for either agency.

How does agency B monitor agency A for interoperability? They used to be
able to use scanners, but scanners do not support decryption.

BTW, these are all LEO channels. In some cases, there are overlapping
coverage areas.

How do you solve this for interoperability? (and no, changing the system
operator's mind is not an option)

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 9:00 PM, richardson_ed wrote:
>
> As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous
> claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability.
> Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation
> are the culprits.
>
> Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained
> on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to
> interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and
> practise the procedures frequently.
>
> The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups.
> These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan
> calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the
> key for that radio better be in your radio.  The radio user should not
> care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the
> designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.




Re: crypto comm

William Barrett, KW1B
 

Lawyers.

KW1B

-----Original Message-----
From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]On Behalf Of
Joe M.
Sent: Tuesday, November 12, 2019 02:41
To: main@Uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm


What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not.


Re: crypto comm

Joe M.
 

I'm not sure making the case that the public would have found
out about the incompetence sooner is going to be very persuasive.

Joe M.

On 11/12/2019 3:31 AM, ROBERT Reynolds via Groups.Io wrote:

Uniformity its going to talk a police officer to get killed/hurt before
the folly of encryption eds.
We had that happen in Pa.A trooper on duty was assassinated---of course
the State Police are fully encrypted and they couldn't talk to the
locals to search for the killer.PLUS their 800 MHz signals FAILED in the
hilly terrain.
State Pollice are now moving back to VHF but they are still fully encrypted!


here is an email i sent to the hea==head of PSP
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Colonel Evanchick:



I am an amateur radio operator, retired, and have an extensive knowledge
of public safety radio systems.. As you know PSP is abandoning the 800
MHz system and building a new system in the VHF range of frequencies.

I would like to make a case that would have PSP drop the encryption
on/* initial dispatches. */ Why am I making that request? I am
convinced if some PSP transmissions "were in the clear" we would not be
in the situation we're in today. An 800 MHz system that didn't work
properly, 800 million dollars in cost overruns and most importantly the
safety of Troopers.. For example, I as one who tunes the public safety
bands would have picked up Troopers frustrations with the 800 MHz system
if encryption wasn't used. That would open the door for me putting
together an investigative report.


Re: crypto comm

ROBERT Reynolds
 


Uniformity its going to talk a police officer to get killed/hurt before the folly of encryption eds.
We had that happen in Pa.A trooper on duty was assassinated---of course the State Police are fully encrypted and they couldn't talk to the locals to search for the killer.PLUS their 800 MHz signals FAILED in the hilly terrain.
State Pollice are now moving back to VHF but they are still fully encrypted!


here is an email i sent to the hea==head of PSP
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dear Colonel Evanchick:



I am an amateur radio operator, retired, and have an extensive knowledge of public safety radio systems.. As you know PSP is abandoning the 800 MHz system and building a new system in the VHF range of frequencies.

I would like to make a case that would have PSP drop the encryption on initial dispatches.    Why am I making that request?  I am convinced if some PSP transmissions "were in the clear" we would not be in the situation we're in today. An 800 MHz system  that didn't work properly, 800 million dollars in cost overruns and most importantly the safety of Troopers.. For example, I as one who tunes the public safety bands would have picked up Troopers frustrations with the 800 MHz system if encryption wasn't used.  That would open the door for me putting together an investigative report. That would trigger lawmakers to stop the overspending on a system that endangers the lives of Troopers. Major Diane Stackhouse explained:


Don't get me wrong.  I believe that SWAT operations, drug stings and other sensitive communications SHOULD be encrypted, but routine day to day dispatches should be should be sent "in the clear"

I have found that most scanner listeners are law abiding citizens and they simply what to know whats going on in their neighborhoods. Encryption takes that away. In fact listeners  have helped law enforcement, saved lives and assisted to track down criminals.





In fact here is a report about a major fire department getting rid of encryption. Please make special note of the 10th paragraph.




I know an argument can be made about officer safety but by keeping routine dispatches in the clear strikes a balance between safety and public transparency.





In a message dated 11/10/2019 12:57:44 PM Eastern Standard Time, wbarrett@... writes:

"Secret Squirrels"


   73
KW1B
-----Original Message-----
From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]On Behalf Of jim myers
Sent: Saturday, November 09, 2019 21:48
To: main@uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

We have about 9 LE agencies in my county. ONE of them insists on being encrypted 24/7. A few years ago they had an officer chasing a suspect across several municipalities. None of the other agencies could communicate with them in real time, and by the time their dispatch called the agency that he was currently chasing his suspect through with his location, several minutes had passed, and he was nowhere neat that location. Sadly, he was found shot in the head at the end of a road part way up a mountain.

At the time this happened, they were also on a standalone communications system that isolated them from ALL other LE agencies in the county. They finally decided to join the shared radio system, but STILL insist upon 24/7 encryption for their talkgroups. They are still the ONLY encrypted agency. They can switch to a shared, unencrypted, mutual channel if they need assistance. The last time they needed help, no one in their department know what channel to switch to...


Re: crypto comm

Joe M.
 

You're fortunate. I can name three offhand that were all chiefs within a 10 mile radius. One was busted for breaking and entering, one for illegal gun sales, and one for illegal contact with a minor (which was actually a sting operation). Another (also a chief) was reportedly fired for abuse of a subordinate.

The third of those four still holds a LEO position in another municipality (as does the fourth, but no charges were brought in that case AFAIK).

In that 10 mile radius there are about 10 chiefs, so that is a 40% rate.
Not exactly a very small minority.

I also know of another LEO who has had recent charges (multiple including assault) brought in that same area. He replaced another person who had a complaint filed against him for reportedly pulling a gun on a motorist in a road rage incident.

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 8:48 PM, Rich wrote:
agree. over a near 30-yr career i've known and worked with literally
hundreds of officers. a few were lazy, some were goofy but none were
criminal or people i wouldn't want living next door. it's unfortunate
that the very, very small minority of officers have caused some on this
list to become jaded and disillusioned.

Rich via iPad

On Nov 11, 2019, at 19:26, Don Curtis <Don.Curtis@...
<mailto:Don.Curtis@...>> wrote:

Having been in the profession for 26 years, mine is an educated
guess. I am talking criminal conduct bad... doubt there is even
close to 10,000 of them.

On November 11, 2019 6:14:18 PM "David O'Banion via Groups.Io"
<spacemissing@...
<mailto:spacemissing@...>> wrote:

Probably closer to 30,000, if not more --- but that's just a guess.

David
KJ6QKV


On Sunday, November 10, 2019, 03:44:58 PM PST, Don Curtis
<don.curtis@... <mailto:don.curtis@...>> wrote:



Of course there are bad cops, and I guarantee you won't catch them by
listening to dispatch.

There's bad people in every group. I would bet as a percentage, the
police are way towards the bottom compared to other groups.

There are close to 1 million sworn police officers in the US. 1% of
1 million is 10,000 and I seriously doubt there are 10,000 law
breaking cops out there.

Just saying...


Re: crypto comm

Joe M.
 

What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not. The system operator will not program agency B's radios with agency A's channels. The operator's argument is that there are common channels for interoperability, but these channels do not carry the dispatch traffic for either agency.

How does agency B monitor agency A for interoperability? They used to be able to use scanners, but scanners do not support decryption.

BTW, these are all LEO channels. In some cases, there are overlapping coverage areas.

How do you solve this for interoperability? (and no, changing the system operator's mind is not an option)

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 9:00 PM, richardson_ed wrote:

As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous
claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability.
Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation
are the culprits.

Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained
on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to
interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and
practise the procedures frequently.

The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups.
These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan
calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the
key for that radio better be in your radio. The radio user should not
care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the
designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.


Re: crypto comm

Shawn Benoit
 

I want to thank everyone for having a good discussion about encryption without being ride to each other. 

I may not agree with some of your view points but I respect them. 

On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 21:19 Don Curtis <Don.Curtis@...> wrote:
Actually, I shouldn't have said that, in those cities, the political leaders are corrupt and have been for a long time and the the police  chief and commissioners are political appointees.  The large majority of the police officers are good, honest upstanding folks.   But yes, in forever corrupt cities, police corruption is more likely to occur. 



On November 11, 2019 7:09:04 PM Don Curtis <don.curtis@...> wrote:

Chicago or Camden, NJ... Or perhaps Washington DC

On November 11, 2019 6:41:24 PM "don robinson via Groups.Io" <don_551=yahoo.com@groups.io> wrote:

That's also why my city's PD has been under federal purview for several years running. They were dirty, covered up for each other and they got caught time after time.

On Monday, November 11, 2019, 05:15:13 PM PST, Shawn Benoit <shawnbenoit@...> wrote:


Supervise what? How can you adequate supervise something if you are not trained in it? Are you a certified police officer? Sounds like delusions of gradnuer to me.

This is why we have Police Commissions, Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs, Colonel, Superintendents, etc. 

On Sat, Nov 9, 2019 at 9:26 PM William Barrett, KW1B <wbarrett@...> wrote:
I believe that citizens have the right and the responsibility to supervise
at a certain level.  Fully encrypted police comms are not accessaable,
while most are quite routine and do NOT require a high degree of
secrecy. 
 
In those few special other cases, there are methods of COMSEC
well-known to police and military communications people.  Simply
encryping everything is lazy and can lead to Secret Police Mindset.
Not something most people would favor.
 
Routine ops need to be in the clear.
 
   73
   bb
  NC
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]On Behalf Of Shawn Benoit
Sent: Saturday, November 09, 2019 15:45
To: main@uniden.groups.io
Subject: Re: [Uniden] P25 for Cheap

I'm pro encryption for police and EMS communications. Nothing will change that even though it's a hobby and I like to listen. 

On Sat, Nov 9, 2019 at 13:09 Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:
Is that because crime only happens at the
police station and doesn't affect communities?

Do you not care that you will be late to work because
there is an accident blocking your normal route?

Do you not care that you will be ADDING
to the problem (traffic) in the above case?

Are you fine with going to the mall when
there is an active shooter in the area?

If there is a felon loose in your neighborhood,
are you OK letting your kids go out to play?

A FOIA request will not solve any of these cases.
Encryption will not alert you to these cases.
Only clear communications will let you know WHEN you need to know it.

Joe M.



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