In recent years, "interoperability" has become a vital buzz-word in
emergency
communication circles at all levels.
One argument against encryption is that since the systems are complex and
very largely computer-dependent, or even (God forbid) internet-dependent,
many additional Critical Fault Points come into being. It usually takes
expert
technical people to restore normal operation. Long delays when one of these
systems blows a gut happen. Complete loss of integrated call-center
dispatch
points, and integrated computer-aided dispatch and trunked systems have
happened more often than the poropnents of these systems will happily admit.
These things can be delicate. Great and efficient when they're working,
and all
is normal; nightmarish in the extreme when something pops.
Software failures, hardware failures, programming failures, "sour" uodates,'
and other weaknesses not present in simpler repeater or simplex systems.,
have all happened more often than any of us would like.
I lived for many years in a small Connecticut town. The F.D. was on
low-band
simplex. 100 watt base, 100 watt mobiles, a small tower on top of the
firehouse,
and in this hilly little town, it all worked fine. There were a very few
dead-spots,
but these were well known, and a Fire Police car was placed "just
outside of the
crater" to relay in the very few times it became a problem -- maybe
three times
in over thirty years. It was simple, robust, and many firemen knew
enough from
their CB activites to troubleshoot and fix simple faults.
Yes, the Contracted Radio Man would also come when called, and work his
magic, but that was always a several hour delay -- and in more than a few
hurricanes, ice storms and other widespread "problems," those delays were
very long because the bigger cities with much bigger populations deserved
priority service. In a few cases, travel was extremely difficult for
the techs.
One police chief in my state once jokingly said he would put the Contracted
Radio Maintenence guy under protective arrest, and keep him in town till
any emergency passed. (He WAS joking -- he insisted.)
Then, my little hilly town was sold the Great Idea of a modern, digital,
trunked
and encrypted system for all Public Safety Agencies. Well, the road guys,
and the building inspector guys and even the dog guy all wanted a piece of
the new system, too -- because it would be */_so_/* much better than
their old-fashioned
mix of low-band and high band simplex and repeaters.
A couple of *_years_* later, they finished ironing out all the many
cramps and problems
and lawsuits (folks didn't like the numerous ugly necessary towers, the
enviros didn't
like the destruction of habitat, and others feared the system would give
them cancer,
and they ALL had lawyers).
Millions of bux and years later, it was all humming just fine -- and
then it had a
couple of Serious Problems in coincidental quick succession, and the
catterwaulling
and accusations, and recriminations were amazing and expensive.
*/My point:/* to me (an old-fashioned guy raised on vacuum tubes) the
systems are
delicate, and failures are more universal (the */entire/* thing fails)
and hard to quickly
work around and fix.
Cops wanna be totally encrypted? Fine. Lots of good arguments for it.
Too many "curious-seekers" show up at F.D. events -- so, F.D. wants to
data-deny the general public? Fine. Macht nichts to me. Keep the idiots
away. No problem.
But accept this: the systems are delicate and take specialized folks to
fix,
and often take longer to fix, and they don't "fail gracefully." They never
work poorly -- they work perfectly, or not at all. Suddenly at times.
I speak for no one other than myself.
73
KW1B
-----Original Message-----
*From:* main@Uniden.groups.io [mailto:main@Uniden.groups.io]*On Behalf
Of *richardson_ed
*Sent:* Monday, November 11, 2019 21:01
*To:* main@Uniden.groups.io
*Subject:* Re: [Uniden] crypto comm

Glad everyone is entitled to their opinion. Situations may also vary
depending on location, rural versus metropolitan.

As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the
erroneous claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to
interoperability. Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and
improper implementation are the culprits.

Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly
trained on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when
it comes to interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they
should drill and practise the procedures frequently.

The system planners will designate either common channels or
talkgroups. These can either be encrypted or clear. If the
interoperability plan calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of
another agency, then the key for that radio better be in your
radio. The radio user should not care whether it is encrypted or
clear, they simply switch to the designated channel/talkgroup and
communicate as trained.

(snip for bandwidth)


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