Re: crypto comm

Paul Valeriani <rebelsun2000@...>

As a retired Police Officer, and former administrative communications officer for the department, I can tell you it's the Radio Manufacturers, sales people, and communications engineers that are going to get Police Officers, Firefighters, and other public safety personnel injured and killed.  It's not "hogwash",
"poor training" and "improper implementation" that are the culprits.
To blame training and procedures, practice, and drills as the culprit, is just wrong.  It's obvious that richardson_ed was never a Public Safety officer, working in the field, under high stress, dangerous conditions, and circumstances, but has come up with his observations from books, corporate guidelines, and his ivory tower.  
We need to get back to basics.  When I started on the job in 1974, the only thing you had to know about radios, was push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  We didn't have to be some sort of quasi engineers, on top of being Police Officers, and social workers, in order to do our job.  Drive the car, or walk the beat, enforce the laws, and push the button to talk, release the button to listen.  That's what we need to get back to.  Not trunked, encrypted, multi channel, computer controlled gadgets, that have too many moving parts, all subject to break down or fail, and leave the cop on the street, or the firefighter inside the burning building, alone, with their ass hanging out, with no communications, because this multi million dollar fiasco they have created, failed again.  But it's not the damn engineers fault, or the manufacturers fault who is pushing this agenda, making tons of money, on the backs of the street cops and firefighters who have to deal with their messed up radio systems during life and death situations.
Go into a Police station after a cop is killed and make the comments you made in your statement on this thread, and I can guarantee you won't walk out of that station in the same condition you walked in.
Push the button to talk.....release the button to listen!

On Tuesday, November 12, 2019, 02:40:55 AM EST, Joe M. <mch@...> wrote:

What is your professional solution to the following:

Agency A has encryption. Agency B does not. The system operator will not
program agency B's radios with agency A's channels. The operator's
argument is that there are common channels for interoperability, but
these channels do not carry the dispatch traffic for either agency.

How does agency B monitor agency A for interoperability? They used to be
able to use scanners, but scanners do not support decryption.

BTW, these are all LEO channels. In some cases, there are overlapping
coverage areas.

How do you solve this for interoperability? (and no, changing the system
operator's mind is not an option)

Joe M.

On 11/11/2019 9:00 PM, richardson_ed wrote:
> As a public safety communication engineer, I am sick of the erroneous
> claims that encryption causes delays and barriers to interoperability.
> Total hogwash in these days. Poor training and improper implementation
> are the culprits.
> Every officer, firefighter or paramedic needs to be thoroughly trained
> on the use of their communication equipment. Especially when it comes to
> interoperability. Not only should they be trained, they should drill and
> practise the procedures frequently.
> The system planners will designate either common channels or talkgroups.
> These can either be encrypted or clear. If the interoperability plan
> calls for accessing the encrypted talkgroup of another agency, then the
> key for that radio better be in your radio.  The radio user should not
> care whether it is encrypted or clear, they simply switch to the
> designated channel/talkgroup and communicate as trained.

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